CBCA 6093
Board: CBCA
Agency: General Services Administration
Appellant: HPI/GSA-4C, L.P.
Date: 2020-07-15
Outcome: granted
GRANTED IN PART: July 15, 2020
CBCA 6093
HPI/GSA-4C, L.P.,
Appellant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Maureen C. McDonald, Scott M. Heimberg, and Elise A. Farrell of Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, Washington, DC, counsel for Appellant.
Alexander C. Vincent, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Judges VERGILIO, KULLBERG, and RUSSELL.
RUSSELL, Board Judge.
Appellant, HPI/GSA-4C, L.P. (HPI), appealed the contracting officerâs decision
denying its claim for unpaid rent under a lease agreement between appellant and respondent,
the General Services Administration (GSA or agency). HPI claimed that GSA did not
provide proper notice to terminate the lease agreement and seeks rental payment for the
period of August 20, 2016, through March 6, 2017, and other costs. The parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment. By decision dated March 31, 2020, the Board granted HPIâs
motion on entitlement. Based upon the plain language of the lease, we found that GSA failed
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to provide proper notice as required under the termination provision of the lease and
remained obligated to pay rent for the disputed period. HPI/GSA-4C, L.P. v. General
Services Administration, CBCA 6093, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,567.
The parties subsequently submitted a joint report on damages addressing three issues:
(1) mitigationâspecifically, whether the sale price of the leased property in a condemnation
action included an amount covering the damages at issue in this appeal such that HPI has
already been fully compensated for the loss of rental income from GSA; (2) calculation of
damages and interest under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109
(2018); and (3) HPIâs entitlement to interest under the Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3901- 3907. Each of these issues is addressed in turn.
Mitigation
This appeal relates to a property that HPI leased to GSA and that was the subject of
a condemnation action filed by California in October 2015. GSA and California
subsequently entered into a stipulation in February 2016 pursuant to GSAâs decision not to
oppose Californiaâs use of the property. HPI opposed the condemnation action separately
and did not sign the stipulation. GSAâs tenant agency, the Internal Revenue Service, vacated
the property on August 19, 2016. GSA stopped making rental payments after that date. HPI,
its lender, the owner of the land on which the property sat, and the ownerâs lender entered
into a separate settlement agreement with California, and the state took possession of the
property on March 7, 2017.
In April 2018, HPI appealed to the Board GSAâs denial of its claim for rent for the
period August 20, 2016, through March 6, 2017. As indicated above, we found that GSA
failed to provide proper notice that it was terminating the lease as required by the terms of
the lease and, thus, remained obligated to pay the rent for this period.
Although GSA does not dispute that HPI received nothing from the sale proceeds, the
agency nevertheless wants the Board to infer that HPI received a benefit because California
considered various factors, including future rental income stream, in settling the
condemnation action based on the stateâs assessment of the propertyâs value. However, GSA
was not a party to that action and did not alter its contract with HPI to change its contractual
obligations.
While the above permits the Board to conclude that GSA remained obligated to pay
rent, further arguments by GSA are unavailing. GSA has offered no evidence that a purpose
of the settlement agreement and Californiaâs payment under the agreement was to
compensate HPI for its loss of rental income under the lease at issue in this appeal, or to
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extinguish GSAâs obligation to pay HPI amounts due under the lease. Indeed, Californiaâs
representative in the action provided deposition testimony that, with an unsegregated offer,
the state leaves it up to the landlord and tenant to resolve matters of amounts due under a
lease, between themselves or with the assistance of a court. HPIâs vice-president and
secretary provided deposition testimony that â[a]t no time did HPI believe or agree that the
$10.9 million payment to HPIâs lender included any rent that GSA owed HPI, or would come
to owe HPI, . .