CBCA 5259

GRANTED: January 18, 2017 CBCA 5259 KIRK RINGGOLD, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Respondent. Christopher L. Campbell of Baker Manock & Jensen, PC, Fresno, CA, counsel for Appellant. Elin M. Dugan, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, San Francisco, CA, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), GOODMAN, and CHADWICK. CHADWICK, Board Judge. Kirk Ringgold leased land in California to the United States Forest Service, a component of the respondent, Department of Agriculture (USDA), for use as a helicopter pad during a forest fire. He seeks $6000 in rent for the fifteen days the agency took to restore the property after vacating it. Mr. Ringgold elected the accelerated procedure of Board Rule 53 (48 CFR 6101.53 (2015)), but we resumed our usual procedure after delays requested by the parties made us unable to resolve the appeal in 180 days. The parties submitted the appeal on the written record under Rule 19, and we now grant it. Background The record and our findings are thin. Mr. Ringgold relies mainly on his own interrogatory responses, which are not sworn and are thus of minimal value as evidence. CBCA 5259 2 See Rule 10; Fed. R. Civ. P. 603, 801(d)(2) (prior statement of opposing party is not hearsay). USDA, for its part, admits few facts, with important exceptions. Mr. Ringgold signed the lease in August 2015. The copy of the lease in the appeal file has no government signature, but USDA admits the contract was formed. The rent was $400 “[f]or each day, or portion therof[,] that the facilities are used.” The lease provided that “[t]he Government may make alterations” and “shall restore owner’s facilities to the[ir] condition . . . prior to Government occupancy; restoration shall be performed to the extent reasonably practical. Claims for reasonable costs incurred by the owner in restoring facilities to their prior condition shall be submitted to the Contracting Officer.” Forest Service contractors moved telephone equipment and portable toilets onto the property, along with enough “rock” to make the soil less muddy. The agency stopped using the site as a helicopter pad on September 24, 2015. The contracting officer promptly asked Mr. Ringgold to sign a “final” invoice, but Mr. Ringgold’s wife advised the agency by email on September 26 (a Saturday) that the Ringgolds would expect rent until everything the agency had brought on site was gone. The contracting officer replied that the Forest Service could not control when its contractors would retrieve their items, and it would not remove the rock. He added, “Final date on the invoice will remain as is.” USDA admits that the equipment and toilets remained on the property for at least a few days, and that the rock was relocated on the property, per Mr. Ringgold’s instructions, “at Forest Service expense, on October 9, 2015.” On October 21, 2015, Ms. Ringgold emailed the contracting officer a final invoice with the note, “An add’l 15 days rent, $6,000, is owed through 10/09/15 when USFS contractors were gone and rock removed. Please process this invoice for prompt payment of this agreed on amount for . . . helibase use.” The Forest Service did not pay the $6000 and advised the Ringgolds that, if they believed additional rent was due, they should “submit [a] claim as outlined in the guidance/regulations.” Mr. Ringgold filed this appeal in May 2016, more than sixty days after the contracting officer received the invoice for the extra rent. Discussion USDA argues that Mr. Ringgold did not submit a claim, so we lack jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act. See 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2012). The October 2015 invoice was a claim. See 48 CFR 2.101 (defining “claim”). We use “a common sense analysis to determine whether the contractor communicated [a] desire for a contracting officer’s decision” on a demand for a sum certain. Moss Card Consulting, Inc. v. General Services Administration, CBCA 5193, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,291, at 176,988. Ms. Ringgold plainly communicated such a desire on Mr. Ringgold’s behalf by asking the contracting officer to “process” the invoice with the disputed extra rent. When the contracting officer CBCA 5259 3 did not issue an appealable decision on the claim within sixty days, Mr. Ringgold could deem the claim denied and file this appeal. 41 U.S.C.