CBCA 5559

Board: CBCA Agency: Department of Justice Appellant: Devin Richardson Date: 2018-03-29 Outcome: dismissed
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DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: March 29, 2018 CBCA 5559 DEVIN RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent. Devin Richardson, pro se, Albany, NY. William D. Robinson and Sarah K. Bloom, Commercial Law Branch, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges HYATT, VERGILIO, and RUSSELL. HYATT, Board Judge. Devin Richardson filed this appeal seeking relief from the Bureau of Prisons’ alleged breach of an agreement in which he agreed to participate in a Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP agreement). The Board issued an order to show cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, explaining to Mr. Richardson that the contract in issue did not appear to be a procurement contract within the scope of the Contracts Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2012) (CDA). In response to that order, the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of CBCA 5559 2 jurisdiction. Because we conclude that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. Background At the time he entered into the treatment program, and when he filed this appeal, Mr. Richardson was incarcerated in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at the Schuylkill Federal Correctional Institution (FCI-Schuylkill) in Minersville, Pennsylvania. While there, Mr. Richardson applied for admission to, and was accepted by, the residential program for treatment of drug abuse. This treatment program is offered to inmates who have a documented substance abuse disorder, who volunteer to undergo treatment, and who have sufficient time remaining in their sentence to complete the entire program. Participating inmates are housed separately from the general prison population and must complete a course of activities administered by treatment specialists and a drug abuse program coordinator. Participants are required to complete a minimum of 500 treatment hours, which usually takes somewhere from nine to twelve months to achieve. In his complaint, Mr. Richardson states that although the RDAP agreement, which he identifies as the contract that respondent has allegedly breached, specified a start date of April 4, 2016, he was required to enter the program on February 24, 2016. Appellant further states that he was told that this early placement would not accrue treatment hours until April 4, 2016. Appellant contends that the early placement violated the terms of the RDAP agreement by increasing the number of hours he had to remain in the program and forcing him to forgo income he would have received from his prison employment detail if he had not been placed in the program on the earlier date. The RDAP agreement memorializes Mr. Richardson’s election to participate in the drug abuse treatment program provided by the Bureau of Prisons. The document sets forth the rules and requirements of the program. In signing the document, the participant confirms that he understands what is expected of program participants and recognizes the consequences for failing to comply with the enumerated rules, requirements, and expectations. There are no contract terms and conditions that would customarily be included in a contract covered by the CDA. Mr. Richardson unsuccessfully appealed his early start date through FCI-Schuylkill’s administrative procedures. He then submitted a letter to the doctor in charge of the drug abuse treatment program, who did not respond to his claims. Thereafter, appellant appealed what he considered to be the deemed denial of his claim to the Board, seeking redress for income he lost due to his early entry into the program, and requesting an order compelling the Bureau of Prisons to adhere to the terms of the treatment contract dated February 4, 2014. CBCA 5559 3 After reviewing the notice of appeal and supporting documentation provided by Mr. Richardson, the Board issued an order directing him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Richardson filed no response to that order. The Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Board forwarded to appellant a copy of that motion, together with an additional copy of the show cause order, again requesting appellant’s response.