Aircraft Braking Systems Corporation
Case: B-261968
Agency:
Protester: Aircraft Braking Systems Corporation
Date: 1995-11-16
Denied
B-261968
Nov 16, 1995
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Highlights
Protest that agency denied protester reasonable opportunity to compete because the time allowed to qualify its wheel and brake assembly was insufficient is denied where the record establishes that the protester had as much time as its competitor to qualify its assembly prior to the issuance of the instant solicitation and the agency reasonably determined that it could not delay the procurement until the protester obtained source approval. Is unduly restrictive. The wheel and brake assemblies sought under the RFP are a part of the main landing gear for the aircraft. They are considered flight critical items because a failure of the wheel and brake assembly during operation of the aircraft could significantly affect flight safety.
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Matter of: Aircraft Braking Systems Corporation File: B-261968 Date: November 16, 1995
Protest that agency denied protester reasonable opportunity to compete because the time allowed to qualify its wheel and brake assembly was insufficient is denied where the record establishes that the protester had as much time as its competitor to qualify its assembly prior to the issuance of the instant solicitation and the agency reasonably determined that it could not delay the procurement until the protester obtained source approval.
Attorneys
DECISION
Aircraft Braking Systems Corporation (ABSC) protests any award under request for proposals (RFP) No. F42630-95-R-22041, issued by the Department of the Air Force to acquire an improved wheel and brake assembly for certain F-16 aircraft to replace those supplied by ABSC under a prior contract. ABSC primarily argues that a solicitation requirement for radial tire compatibility exceeds the requirements of the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) design specifications, is unduly restrictive, and impermissibly favors its competitor, BF Goodrich Aerospace (BFG).
We deny the protest.
The F-16 C/D fleet consists of two blocks, or types, of aircraft, block 40/42 and block 50/52. The wheel and brake assemblies sought under the RFP are a part of the main landing gear for the aircraft. They are considered flight critical items because a failure of the wheel and brake assembly during operation of the aircraft could significantly affect flight safety. The prime contractor and OEM of the F-16 fleet is General Dynamics Corporation, Fort Worth Division. The OEM equipped the block 40/42 aircraft with a wheel and brake assembly manufactured by ABSC, and the block 50/52 aircraft with a wheel and brake assembly manufactured by BFG. The ABSC 40/42 assembly and the BFG 50/52 assembly were each qualified to the same OEM design specification. ABSC and BFG were the sole source suppliers of replenishment spares; ABSC for the 40/42 block and BFG for the 50/52 block.
In 1991, BFG sought source approval for its wheel and brake assembly to be used on the block 40/42 aircraft. The Air Force performed a 2-year field service evaluation (FSE) by installing the BFG assembly on a limited number of block 40/42 aircraft. The FSE established that BFG's assembly was fully interchangeable with the ABSC 40/42 assembly, and has an expected life of 767 landings, compared to the ABSC assembly which has an expected life of 250 landings. The BFG assembly was approved for use on the block 40/42 aircraft in December 1993.
Meanwhile, the agency states, since being put into operational use, ABSC's F-16 block 40/42 wheel and brake assembly has not met the expected performance standards. Specifically, field use and performance tests of the ABSC assembly demonstrated that the brakes were averaging only 250 landings before replacement of carbon heat stacks was required. This performance average was contrary to the design specification requirement that the brake life "shall be at least 500 aircraft brake usage sequences (i.e., landings)" with a design goal of "1000 aircraft brake usage sequences." Other performance problems with the ABSC assembly were identified as severe wheel corrosion, inadequate heat shielding, extensive torque cracking, deformed rotor channels, inadequate brake heat stacks, and locked brakes.
In 1990 and 1991, the Air Force experienced severe reliability and maintenance problems with the 40/42 fleet because the service life of the ABSC assembly continued to be shorter than expected. This gave rise to degraded aircraft support in the form of depleted inventory and continuous back orders. The agency incurred excessive manpower and replacement costs, as it frequently had to ask ABSC to accelerate delivery of replenishment spares to ensure continued aircraft support. ABSC did accelerate delivery of some wheel components but was not able to improve delivery of the more urgent brake parts.
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