Learjet, Inc.

Learjet, Inc. BNUMBER: B-274385; B-274385.2; B-274385.3 DATE: December 6, 1996 TITLE: Learjet, Inc. ********************************************************************** Matter of:Learjet, Inc. File: B-274385; B-274385.2; B-274385.3 Date:December 6, 1996 Lars E. Anderson, Esq., and J. Scott Hommer III, Esq., Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, for the protester. L. Graeme Bell III, Esq., Crowell & Moring, LLP, for Tracor Flight Systems, Inc., the intervenor. Major Jeffrey W. Watson, Michael J. Mullin, Esq., John Laricca, Esq., and Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency. Robert C. Arsenoff, Esq., and Paul I. Lieberman, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision. DIGEST 1. Protest allegations based on a disagreement with the agency over the interpretation of solicitation requirements are untimely since they were not raised within 10 days after the protester was informed in writing during discussions of the agency's interpretation of the solicitation. 2. Agency properly considered technical data contained in protester's proposal which called into question the proposal's acceptability while not requesting similar data from awardee where the solicitation did not require the submission of such data. 3. Protester's mere disagreement with agency evaluation does not provide a basis for disturbing that evaluation. 4. Protest challenging a cost/technical tradeoff decision is denied where: (1) no tradeoff was required because: protester's proposal was technically unacceptable and could not form the basis for an award; and (2) the decision was reached in accordance with the solicitation's method of award provisions. DECISION BACKGROUND Learjet, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Tracor Flight Systems, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No. F33657-95-R-0082, issued by the Department of the Air Force for C-21A replacement aircraft and related contractor logistics support (CLS).[1] Learjet alleges that proposals were improperly evaluated and that the cost/technical tradeoff decision resulting in the award to Tracor was flawed. We deny the protest. The RFP, issued on March 21, 1996, with a May 7 closing date for initial proposals, contemplated the award of two contracts to a single offeror--for two replacement aircraft (with an option to purchase two more aircraft) and for CLS services. Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal was determined to present the best value to the government considering integrated management framework (IMF) and most probable life cycle cost (MPLCC). IMF was subdivided into two equally weighted factors--technical and CLS. The IMF factors were to be assigned three ratings: a color/adjectival rating based upon how well the proposal met the solicitation requirements; a proposal risk rating based upon the perceived risk of the offeror's proposed approach to accomplish the RFP requirements; and a performance risk rating based on past and present performance. Although a total of four aircraft could be purchased, the RFP provided that the MPLCC was to be calculated using the basic quantity of two aircraft. Proposals were received from Learjet and Tracor. Following an objective oral presentation (OOP) by each offeror, the source selection evaluation team (SSET) evaluated Learjet's proposal as "red" (unacceptable) with moderate proposal risk in the technical area and "yellow" (marginal) with low proposal risk in the CLS area. Tracor's proposal was rated as "yellow" with moderate proposal risk in both areas. Learjet's proposal received an unacceptable technical rating because the SSET found that both the proposal and the OOP identified problems in complying with two RFP technical requirements set forth in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD)--aircraft range and cabin noise. With respect to the range requirement, the ORD specified that the aircraft had to be capable of completing a flight profile from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland to a destination airport at San Francisco with a missed approach and diversion to an alternate airport 120 nautical miles away; upon completion of the profile, the aircraft had to have reserve fuel as stated in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-206. Learjet identified a problem at the OOP with meeting this requirement, specifying that it could meet the standard under certain wind conditions if fuel reserves were calculated by Learjet's particular reading of AFI 11-206 which in effect would double count Learjet's reserves by giving it credit for each leg of the flight profile.