Signals & Systems, Incorporated, B-288107, September 21, 2001

B-288107 Sep 21, 2001 Jump To VIEW DECISION RELATED PAGES GAO CONTACTS Highlights Protest of an agency's justification for a noncompetitive procurement on the basis of unusual and compelling urgency is sustained. How many vehicle control units would have to be replaced. 2. Despite knowing of safety concerns with a vehicle control system that would have to be replaced. SSI contends that the Army does not have the claimed unusual and compelling urgency justifying the noncompetitive award to KDS and that. The Army purchased more units from KDS than was necessary to meet its urgent requirements. BACKGROUND The HMMWV is a one and one-quarter ton. Is used by various agencies supported by the U.S. /1/ and is relied upon for all of the Army's general transportation requirements. View Decision Signals & Systems, Incorporated, B-288107, September 21, 2001 DIGEST Attorneys DECISION Signals & Systems, Incorporated (SSI) protests the Department of the Army's sole-source award of a contract to KDS Controls, Inc. under solicitation No. DAAE07-01-R-S098 for engine electrical start systems (EESS) for the High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). SSI contends that the Army does not have the claimed unusual and compelling urgency justifying the noncompetitive award to KDS and that, even if the record establishes urgency, the Army purchased more units from KDS than was necessary to meet its urgent requirements. SSI also contends that to the extent the agency has urgent requirements, this urgency resulted from the Army's lack of advanced procurement planning. We sustain the protest. BACKGROUND The HMMWV is a one and one-quarter ton, four-wheel drive, tactical vehicle designed for use over all types of roads and terrain in all weather conditions. Contracting Officer Statement at 1. The vehicle, in various configurations, is used by various agencies supported by the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armament Command (TACOM), including the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard, and Border Patrol, Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at I-25, /1/ and is relied upon for all of the Army's general transportation requirements. Supplemental Agency Report (Aug. 9, 2001), at 1-2. The Army's fleet of HMMWVs currently exceeds 100,000 vehicles, all of which are powered by V-8, liquid-cooled, diesel engines. Contracting Officer's Statement at 1; Tr. at I-26. Each HMMWV has a remote control switch that heats the diesel engine's glow plugs to the appropriate temperature before the driver can start the engine. The vehicle operator turns the starter switch, which activates the remote control switch and "wait to start" light system. The remote control switch sends power to the engine glow plugs, heating the plugs to the proper temperature. After the plugs reach the proper temperature, the "wait to start" light extinguishes, and the driver can start the vehicle. Contracting Officer's Statement at 1. Since the first HMMWVs were fielded in the 1980s, the Army has used several different types of remote control switch systems. The first, which came with the original production HMMWVs, was the protective control box, which the Army used exclusively for 12 years. Because HMMWVs with the protective control box system proved difficult to start in cold weather and experienced "excessive glow plug burn out," the Army decided in 1997 to replace the protective control box system with a new system, the EESS that is the subject of the procurement at issue here. Until the EESS could be designed and fielded, however, the Army decided to replace the protective control box with an interim system, called the vehicle control unit, which was designed by the Army. /2/ Tr. at II-120-21. The Army began purchasing the first version of the vehicle control unit, designated type 10, in December 1997. Agency Report, Tab E, Vehicle Control Unit Contract. Approximately 15,000 type-10 vehicle control units were purchased and fielded by the Army. Supplemental Agency Report, Statement of Army Light Truck Group Sustainment Team Leader (Aug. 9, 2001), at 1; Tr. at I-32. Early in 1998, the Army began receiving reports of significant problems with the vehicle control unit, including "phantom cranking" (that is, the vehicle's starter would engage without operator intervention or while the vehicle was already in gear). In April 1999, a "safety of use message" (SOUM) was issued concerning the type-10 vehicle control unit, in which commanders were directed to ensure that "any time the vehicle [with a type-10 vehicle control unit] is parked and unattended[,] power must be disconnected between the starter and the [unit]." /3/ Hearing exh. No. 2, SOUM 99-07 (Apr. 1999), at 3. The SOUM informed users as follows: If the starter cranks on its own, it can continue until the batteries are disconnected, drained of power, or the starter or wiring harness shorts out.